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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
DISCONNECTION OF 
TERRITORY FROM LAYTON 
CITY, A MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION OF THE STA TE 
OF UTAH 
Case No. 
12456 
BRIEF 0'F APP·ELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for disconnection of territory from 
Layton City under Title 10, Chapter 4, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court ordered disconnection of the terri-
tory. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the decree granting dis-
connection and an order directing the entry of a decree 
denying disconnection. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Reference in this brief to petitioner refers to Rober 
D. Sawyer, since he was the principal agent and manage 
for the partnership owner of the tract in question. 
On July 19, 1961, petitioner appeared before th 
Layton City Planning Commission with a preliminar 
drawing of "Rolling Oaks" subdivision, a proposed su~ 
division of land located east of the main part of Layto1 
City (R. 53). Discussion ensued regarding lot sizes, fi 
nancing, water easements, sewers, drainage, type o 
homes to be built, the property's location in the Hill Ai 
Force Base flight path with attendant requirement fo 
less dense housing, road grading, tie-in with existin, 
roads, setback requirements, and dedication of walkway: 
Mr. Sawyer was assured that the Layton City Plannin. 
Commission shared his views about maintaining the zor 
ing for high quality housing in the area. He was told th 
commission did not oppose his request for approval c 
the proposed subdivision. He stated he wished to develo 
as fast as possible, although completion of developmer 
was programmed for five to eight years. An appointmer 
was set for a planning commission representative t 
meet Mr. Sawyer eight days later and assist him with a: 
details, particularly with his roads in relation to the La) 
ton City master road plan. Mr. Sawyer was apprised c 
requirements for the filing of a final preliminary plat. 
Layton City then heard nothing at all from Mr. Sa'VI 
yer for seven years. 
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In March 1968 petitioner filed this action in the dis-
trict court to disconnect eighty acres from Layton City 
and transfer it into East Layton Town. Upon the hearing 
of the action, the district court entered an order discon-
necting the eighty-acre tract in question. 
Reference to other material facts is made in the points 
of the argument herein, and no useful purpose would be 
served by duplicate reference here. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE STATUTE, BROAD IN ITS TERMS, MUST TAKE 
CONTENT FROM PAST DECISIONS OF THIS COURT 
AND FROM COURTS OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS. 
Our tradition is that our government is one of laws 
and not of men. For the most part, our legislative enact-
ments are in accord with this principle and give adequate 
standards for the measurement of conduct or performance. 
But the statute which is pertinent here is an exception. It 
says, in part: 
If the court finds . . . that justice and equity re-
quire that such territory or any part thereof should 
be disconnected from such city or town, it shall 
appoint three disinterested persons as commission-
ers ... (Sec. 10-4-2, U.C.A. 1953, emphasis add-
ed) 
What are "justice" and "equity"? These abstrac-
tions should always be applied in whatever business 
comes before the courts. Normally there is involved a 
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cause of action based on familiar legal principles, or a 
statute which supplies definite criteria. Both are lacking 
here. What is just and equitable to a district judge sitting 
in one court on a given day may be very different from 
the ideas of a different judge in a different court on the 
same day. Without ascertainable standards, we get the 
judgment of men and not control by laws. 
If that statute, therefore, is not to be arbitrarily ap-
plied it must be given form and content by the past de-
cisions of this court. Only by reading into it the stand-
ards established in past decisions, including those from 
other jurisdictions, can we reach some conclusions as to 
when territory should be severed from a city and when it 
should not be. 
The earliest Utah decision is Young v. Salt Lake 
City, 24 U. 321, 67 P. 1066 (1902). Disconnection was 
allowed. It appeared that: 
( 1) The land was not platted 
(2) The land was not situated so as to render it de-
sirable that it be platted to be used for residential or busi-
ness purposes 
(3) It was situated five miles from the business sec-
tion of the city 
(4) The land was unfit for municipal or residential 
purposes 
( 5) The land had not and could not receive fire or 
police protection or other municipal benefits of any kind. 
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Next came In re Fullmer, 33 U. 43, 92 P. 768 ( 1907). 
Here, the land was agricultural, and received "no direct 
or appreciable benefit". The Town of Mapleton asserted 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative function, which 
was rejected on the authority of Young, and disconnection 
was allowed. 
The next case is Christensen v. Town of Clearfield, 
66 U. 455, 243 P. 376 (1926), in which the 681-acre tract 
in question was wholly agricultural land, located one to 
two miles from the four or five buildings making up the 
center of town. It was unplatted and so situated as to 
render it undesirable for platting. It received no fire pro-
tection, no benefit from police protection, and had its 
own water supply. The disconnection was affirmed on 
the authority of Fullmer. 
The following year this court decided In re Town of 
Smithfield, 70 U. 564, 262 P. 105 (1927). The detached 
tracts were agricultural lands receiving no direct or ap-
preciable benefit. Decision was affirmed on the authority 
of Fullmer and Christensen. 
A significant decision is In re Chief Consolidated 
Mining Co., 71 U. 430, 266 P.1044 (1928), which involv-
ed lands in Mammoth City, Juab County. The majority 
of the lands here detached by the lower court were not 
agricultural but were mining areas. This court reversed 
the district court as to the mining areas and affirmed as 
to the level areas with brush growth on them. The court 
found that Mammoth City had shown no population 
growth in eight years and pointed to the fact that there 
; 
was no evidence to indicate any increase in population. 
It observed that there was no reason to anticipate that 
the area allowed to remain detached "will be required for 
an extension of the residential portion of the city." 
A tract of 52.5 acres was disconnected from the Town 
of Moab by the district court in Application of Peterson, 
92 U. 212, 66 P.2d 1195 (1937). On appeal this court af-
firmed, holding that the evidence supported the findings 
and decree. The detached territory was used exclusivly 
for agricultural purposes, having been used for no other 
purpose than to raise hay and other farm products. The 
city's sewer system could not serve the land, and a private 
water supply was available to it. The town's business 
section was about a mile away. The town had made no 
substantial growth in population for many years, and 
"there is no prospect for any immediate increase in the 
future." 
In Howard v. Town of North Salt Lake, 7 U.2d 278, 
323 P.2d 261 (1958), this court dealt with the question 
whether a town which annexed an area seven times its 
original area could compel all of the new area to remain 
in the town solely for tax revenue. The disconnection 
was affirmed on appeal. The severed property was basic-
ally industrial and constituted 61 % of the town's total 
valuation before the severance. The town was incapable 
of supplying water to the property owners, particularly to 
the oil refinery. The town had no fire fighting facilities 
and had no garbage pickup within the disconnected area. 
The district court found that the disconnected territory 
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did not receive and within the foreseeable future would 
not receive any substantial benefit from the town. 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. City of Bingham Canyon, 
18 U.2d 60, 415 P.2d 209 (1966) is the most recent case on 
disconnection decided by this court. In this case the sev-
ered property mothered the city instead of vice versa. The 
severed property was 90% of the city, which had exper-
ienced a population drop from 3,200 people in 1930 to 
7 4 people in 1966. The severance was affirmed. 
Upon analysis, the foregoing cases fall into two cate-
gories: 
(1) Those in which the disconnected land was agri-
cultural and unplatted, and there was no prospect it 
would be needed for the growth of the town, and 
(2) Those in which the property was commercial or 
industrial and the town was unable to serve it adequately. 
The case at bar falls into neither category, but in-
stead presents a novel question to this court. That ques-
tion is: 
Where a 160-acre tract of prime residential land lies 
one-half in one municipality and one-half in the adjoin-
ing municipality and the land has been platted and part 
of the plat recorded and the city from which 80 acres is 
proposed to be severed has a population of 13,621 and a 
growth rate of 57% since the prior ten-year census, and at 
such time as the need for services exists the city can supply 
all needed services and is willing to do so, and the town 
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into which it is proposed to be transferred cannot supply 
municipal services, should such 80-acre tract be discon-
nected? 
It seems clear that the answer should be, No. 
Courts in other jurisdictions have dealt with this 
same problem. In citing the cases that follow, counsel 
does not represent that they are decided under statutes 
like the Utah statute. In most cases, the statute is either 
different substantively or procedurally, but the general 
principles enunciated .have application to the case before 
the court. 
The Nebraska statute also employs the criteria of 
"justice and equity," and decisions from that state are 
helpful in construing our statute. In Shelton Grain & 
Supply Co. v. Village of Shelton (Neb. 1965) 134 N.W. 
2d 815, the court was concerned with an 11.635 acre 
tract of land on the village's east boundary, with U.S. 
Highway 30 on the north and the Union Pacific Rail-
road right-of-way on the south. There were grain stor-
age bins on the parcel; the only ingress to the tract was on 
two roads which entered through the county on the east 
end of the tract. The applicable Nebraska statute, Sec. 
17-414, R.R.S. 1943, provided for review and trial de 
novo in the Supreme Court. The plaintiff contended that 
the tract was used exclusively for agricultural purposes 
and that it received few or no benefits from the village. 
No water or sewer from the village came to any part of 
the tract; there was no village street to the tract. The tract 
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owner argued that it received no snow removal, police, or 
fire protection, and it was geographically separated from 
the village by the highway and the railroad right-of-way. 
The village put in evidence that it received police protec-
tion and snow removal and had never requested water or 
sewer. The village offered fire protection to it also. 
The court found that the village was the focal center 
of the farming area, and that plaintiff's business oper-
ations were benefitted by the centralization of the com-
munity interests. The court held that the operation of the 
grain storage bins was a commercial enterprise, and there-
fore the lands were not exclusively used for agricultural 
purposes. The growth of the village, though not great, 
was in the direction of the acreage. The court found that 
there was a sufficient community of interest between the 
tract and the village to sustain the lower court in retain-
ing the tract within the corporate limits of the village. 
In Creery v. Town of Okoboji (Iowa 1934) 253 
N.W. 810, the defendant resort town had a permanent 
population of 178 but a summer population of from 1500 
to 2500. The town was laid out and platted along a lake 
shore, about four and one-half miles long and between 
one-fourth and one mile wide. The business section of 
the town was in the south end; owners of about half of 
the territory in the north end sought to have it severed. 
Many of the largest and best homes were within that 
north end tract. In denying severance, the court said: "In 
most of the cases awarding a severance, it appears that 
the land sought to be excluded was used almost wholly 
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if not entirely for agricultural purposes; that the lands 
therein were not platted; that there were no residence 
properties therein; and that the territory sought to be 
severed was not needed for the future growth of the city 
or town." (citations omitted.) 
Another pertinent case is Brooks v. City of South 
Sioux Falls (S.D. 1955) 73 N.W. 2d 339, in which the 
petitioners sought exclusion from the defendant city of 
an entire section of land except for a sixty-acre triangular 
tract. The land was agricultural and had not been laid 
out into blocks or lots; there were no streets or alleys in 
the area. The city had no municipal water or sewer sys-
tem, although a water system had been planned. It had 
a volunteer fire department and a police department. Its 
street department had modern road machinery and equip-
ment. The area in question had received the benefits of 
the foregoing services. Between 1945 and 1950, the city's 
increase was 13 7 7(l. The trend of construction was in the 
direction of the excluded area. Residential development 
in the area had reached the point where a number of 
homes had been built along the street bordering the area 
on the east side. None of the recent construction had been 
on the tract in question. 
Defendant city, South Sioux Falls, and the City of 
Sioux Falls are continguous municipalities with the latter 
being north of the former. Their streets appeared to be 
continuations of each other. Much of the area in the tract 
in question was level and usable for residential purposes. 
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The court held: 
The undisputed evidence in this record impels the 
conclusion that much of the excluded area east of 
the river is reasonably needed by the city for resi-
dential territory and will likely be used for that 
purpose in the near future. It seems to us that the 
exclusion of this part of the area does an injustice 
to the remaining portion of the city. That the 
eastern part of the excluded area, whether it is in 
or out of the city, will be occupied by residences in 
the near future seems inevitable. It would be an 
injustice to the inhabitants of the city and close 
proximity thereto to have such development take 
place with this area freed of municipal building 
regulations and other restrictions designed to 
promote the public welfare, safety and comfort. 
These views require a reversal of the judgment 
entered and make unnecessary the consderation of 
the other propositions urged by appellant. 
Another pertinent decision is Iowa Power and Light 
Co. v. Incorporated Town of Pleasant Hill (Iowa 1962) 
112 N.W. 2d 304. Here the municipalities of Pleasant 
Hill and Des Moines adjoined each other, and plaintiff 
sought to have its plant disconnected from the defendant 
and included within the boundaries of Des Moines. Plain-
tiff's reason for asking severance and annexation to Des 
Moines was so as to effect a more equitable distribution 
of its tax money among its customers, and plaintiff had 
carried on extensive negotiations with the city council 
of Des Moines to that end. Had it been able to get into 
Des Moines and out of Pleasant Hill, there was a good 
possibility that a franchise tax would be reduced or 
waived. 
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The court found that plaintiff had failed to show 
that defendant was incapable of providing the municipal 
services normally needed in the territory sought to be sev-
ered. The court said: 
The evidence shows the defendant is capable, 
rather than incapable, of extending into the terri-
tory to be severed substantial municipal services 
and benefits that the territory would not enjoy if 
severed. The statute does not authorize us to sever 
the territory for the purpose of being annexed by 
Des Moines or consider the services or benefits .... 
The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the trial court and 
remanded the case with directions to dismiss plaintiff's 
petition, with the result that the territory remained in the 
defendant town. 
Under a Pennsylvania statute a petition was filed for 
detachment of an area of some 350 acres of Indiana town-
ship and for its annexation to Shaler Township. In re 
Alteration of Lines of Indiana and Shaler Townships (Pa. 
1953) 95 A.2d 506. The court appointed commissioners 
who held a hearing and filed a report recommending that 
the petition be granted and a new boundary line estab-
lished as prayed for. 
In its opinion the court said: 
Where, however, the avowed purpose to be ac-
complished is to detach from the one political sub-
division a substantial portion of its territory and to 
annex it to the other, the reason for the change 
being based on some such consideration as relative 
school facilities, questions of taxation and assess-
ed valuation of property, social conveniences, or 
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the like, the proceeding becomes obviously one of 
annexation and the alteration in the boundary line 
merely incidental to the accomplishment of the 
larger object. 
The court in concluding pointed out that the statute 
under which the petition was filed was one for changing 
boundaries between townships, but could not be used to 
effect a de-annexation from one township and an annex-
ation by the other, and it affirmed the trial court in hold-
ing that the attempted severance and annexation were 
of no effect. 
Again, the reasons for allowing disconnection of 
territory not only in Utah but elsewhere are that the land 
is agricultural and unplatted and does not receive and 
does not need municipal benefits, or the land is improved 
and developed and is not being or cannot be served by 
the city. None of these conditions exist here. 
In its ruling from the bench, made a part of the 
findings of fact in this case, the district court relied heav-
ily on the preference of the owner, stating that he should 
be allowed to develop in whichever municipality he chose. 
This ruling as a matter of law is erroneous. There is not 
a single precedent either in Utah law or any case from any 
other state known to the city's counsel or submitted to the 
court by petitioner's counsel which supports hat decision. 
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POINT II. 
THE LAND IN QUESTION IS NOT SUBJECT TO DIS-
CONNECTION UNDER ANY OF THE TESTS PREV-
IOUSLY USED BY THIS COURT. 
As is pointed out above, the decisions of this court 
have affirmed disconnection only where land is either 
built up, improved and needing services and the city is 
unable to supply them; or is agricultural, receiving no 
benefits but burdened by taxes, unplatted, and not likely 
to be needing municipal services in the future. The land 
in question will not qualify under a single one of these 
criteria. 
It is not agricultural land. Petitioner's counsel said 
in his opening statement, "It is just farm land" (T. 10: 17), 
and petitioner testified it had only been used to raise "a 
little wheat and oats and things like that" before he 
started building homes on it (T.36:3). He also said, 
when skillfully led by counsel, that the eighty acres in 
question was "still agricultural land" (T.36: 13). One 
cannot help asking, Is he serious? Those statements, 
some thirty or so words, are not very convincing when 
matched against the entire remainder of the record of 209 
pages and some tens of thousands of words, the net up-
shot of which is that the land in question is prime resi-
dential (or commercial [T.20: 15]) development land, al-
ready platted and ready to be built on. 
Some examples will illustrate this. The petition it-
self asks severance so that the land can be developed 
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(R-2), not farmed or let go to weeds. Petitioner had his 
engineer plan an outfall sewer line to serve the resi-
dences which will be built on the subject land (T. 27: 16; 
T.93: 1-7), and that line is in the ground. The under-
ground electrical power and telephone lines are all in-
stalled (T.27:5). Petitioner testified he is a developer 
(T.17: 16-30), and he purchased the property for resi-
dential or commercial development (T.20:9-18). There 
are 480 lots planned to go into the subdivision, not count-
ing the townhouse area (Exhibit F). All of the land has 
been platted since 1966 or 1967 (T.55:27), and a plat of 
11 lots has been recorded (T.18: 17). The area was a most 
attractive one for building at the time he acquired it 
(T.18:27) and had been so at least since 1960 (T.18:24); 
R-53 [attached minutes]). He said the principal purpose 
of the land was residential (T.35:29 to T.36: 1), and that 
"it is a natural area here, it is a very beautiful area and 
can be developed into a very nice residential area" (T. 
44: 17). His investment in the land is something over 
$400,000 (T.45:24), and he's in it to sell units at a profit 
and then get out (T.51: 12 to T.52: 11). That doesn't 
sound much like agricultural land. 
Nor is this land unplatted. Something has already 
been mentioned about this above, but a better idea of just 
how platted it is can be gathered from an examination of 
Exhibit F. Additionally, there is the petitioner's testi-
mony at T.18:9-20, T.27:3, and T.25:25. Although no 
plat of the tract within Layton City has been recorded, 
the whole 160 acres has been divided into 480 lots and a 
townhouse area. Topographical maps have been made, 
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the streets have been laid out with their elevations, the 
major utilities except water are in, and the engineering 
has been done for construction of roads, and installation 
of the other off-site improvements. Everything necessary 
to subdivide the land and develop it has been done except 
for recording the final plats, in small sections, as the work 
progresses (T.24: 10, 27). This land will not qualify as 
unplatted land. 
Does the land fail to receive benefits commensurate 
with the taxes? Petitioner fluffed off the amount of the 
taxes by saying he was sure they were under $500 (T. 
36:30). And he admitted on cross-examination that the 
land in question really had no need for any benefits up to 
now (T.60: 13). 
The fallacy in plaintiff's entire position in the dis-
trict court becomes evident at this point. He states he 
ought to be allowed to take his ground out of Layton City 
because it's agricultural land and not receiving any bene-
fits. In the next breath he says he's got to get the land 
disconnected because it's prime residential land, and he's 
got to have benefits immediately. He says further that he 
wants to develop it in only one municipality, and he wants 
to get on with it and he's being delayed. He admits that 
the ground has heretofore had no need for subdivision 
services. Even so, he says, he's now ready to develop in a 
big way and wants to move with dispatch, and Layton 
City has not been very quick to jump in and help him. 
Moreover, he claims, Layton City cannot help him. Let's 
see how much opportunity he gave Layton City to help 
him and whether or not the city is in a position to do so, 
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POINT III. 
THE PETITIONER NEVER REQUESTED ASSIST-
ANCE NOR COOPERATION FROM LAYTON CITY, 
AND PLANNED FROM THE OUTSET TO PROCEED 
WITHOUT CONSULTING THE CITY. 
In 1961, when his father-in-law owned the ground, 
petitioner may have had an open mind about whether and 
how Layton City might help get water and sewer to the 
ground. But after he and his associates acquired the land 
in 1965, he made no genuine approach to Layton City 
about supplying services to it. What he ostensibly did in 
this regard was window-dressing. 
Regarding his first contact with the city in 1961, he 
testified that he met with Layton City officials and told 
them what he had in mind for the ground. They in turn 
showed him the maps of roads and utility services in the 
area and told him what the city's plans were for future 
development (T.18:24 to T.19:8). This comports with 
the minutes of the Layton City Planning Commission 
meeting of July 19, 1961 (R. 53). There is really no dis-
pute to that point. 
But petitioner says he went back in 1968 and talked 
with the city engineer, who was acting for the city, and 
that official turned a deaf ear to him (T.30:4-30; T.33: 17 
to T.35: 10). Yet on cross-examination, he admitted he 
had never had his engineer take his plans and drawings to 
Layton City, had never submitted anything in writing to 
Layton City, and had never asked Layton City to supply 
17 
any services to his ground (T.58, 59; T. 103:17; T.106: 
10). He and his engineer knew that part of his land was 
in Layton City (T.66:8; T.103: 14), and that the sewer sys-
tem was designed to handle not only the tract in question 
but a lot of additional ground which is part of Layton 
City (T.63:24; T.93:3; T.103:21; T.104:1). 
But even more significant are these facts: 
1. Petitioner filed his petition for disconnection on 
March 25, 1968, but his plat for annexation to East Layton 
Town was prepared at least a month earlier, in February 
1968 (Exhibit B). 
2. Petitioner made his decision to try to disconnect 
the eighty acres in question immediately after he hired 
his engineer to design some alternative sewer systems, 
at the very latest in the latter part of 1965. His engineer 
gave a very candid answer on this point, notwithstanding 
counsel's artful objection to stall for time (T.104:4-26): 
Q. So that is when he mentioned this disconnec-
tion of part of this territory, before he even 
started talking to you about sewer. 
MR. GIAQUE: I object to that. 
THE COURT: He may ask. 
A. He mentioned that at one time and I can't 
answer whether it was at the beginning or 
later on. I think it was probably a little later. 
Q. I see. Do you know about how much later it 
would have been? 
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A. Probably about the time we told him how 
much the costs would be when we finished 
the study. 
Q. Two or three months after he first consult-
ed you? 
A. Probably yes, around two or three months. 
Q. So this would be sometime in the late part of 
1965? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And, at that time he was considering discon-
nection of this parcel from the city? 
A. I don't know whether he was definitely or 
not. 
Q. Well, he mentioned it to you at that time? 
A. He said this was a possibility, as I remember 
it. 
3. Petitioner's engineer never recommended to him 
that he see Layton City about cooperation on the develop-
ment (T.106:10), and the development plan which that 
engineer submitted to his municipal client, East Layton 
Town, showed one alternative for the town's outfall 
sewer line as running through petitioner's land, with no 
involvement from Layton City (Exhibit H). This was in 
1965. And that's the plan which was adopted by East 
Layton Town. 
4. The engineering specifications and drawings 
were proceeded with and the contract was let in 1966 and 
1967 (T.32:29). 
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So, any claim of a good faith contact with the Lay-
ton City Engineer for help on this project is certainly not 
truthful. Petitioner's testimony in this respect is just not 
believable. He brought no maps or plats with him to the 
meeting. His brief contact with the Layton City Engineer 
was so superficial that the engineer thought he was a 
real estate man (T.180: 19 to T.181: 13). The only pur-
pose petitioner could have had for that 1968 contact was 
to set up Layton City for a claim of disinterest so as to 
facilitate disconnection. It is a contrived claim. 
In this same category is petitioner's claim of the in-
superable difficulties attendant on developing the same 
project in two municipalities. He went on at length about 
this, and so did his engineer. All of it is speculation and 
opinion; none of it is based on experience or fact. There 
is not one solid piece of competent evidence in the record 
that supports this hobgoblin, and there is a great deal 
of evidence to the contrary. 
For example: Petitioner's statements of development 
problems in two municipalities (T.22:7; T.40: 18 to T. 
42: 16) is contradicted by his statement that he'd never 
had the problem (T.42: 17), that he assumed Layton City 
would charge higher sewer connection fees but no one 
had told him that was so (T.57:9), and that cooperative 
agreements between municipalities would remove his ob· 
jections (T.61:18 to T.62:3). He admitted he had no 
evidence that the building standards for the two munici· 
palities were different (T.59:6-13). Again, his engineer's 
testimony that sewer lift stations don't work well and are 
expensive (T.86:21 to T.88:5) is offset by his testimony 
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that two of the three systems he designed for petitioner 
were lift station systems T.85:15), and he has designed 
them for other clients and they work well (T.108:16). 
His testimony that engineers can't coordinate their work, 
and that standards are different (T.95:27 to T.98: 1) is 
contradicted by his admission that the loop water system 
he had described earlier would be stronger if Layton City 
water came in from the north (T.108:26 to T.109:7), and 
that roads can be adjusted so as to alleviate boundary 
problems (T.110: 18). 
Layton City witnesses identified, and there were ad-
mitted into evidence, Exhibit 3 which is a fire protection 
agreement between Layton City and East Layton Town 
and is similar to one between these municipalities cover-
ing the prior four years (T.144:17), Exhibit 2 which is a 
copy of minutes of the meeting in which a road main-
tenance agreement between the two municipalities was 
approved, and Exhibit 4 which is a resolution authorizing 
expenditure of Layton City funds for services to the tract 
in question. 
The East Layton Town president testified that the 
fire agreement worked satisfactorily (T.174:1 and see 
T.40: 14), that the Fairfield Street maintenance agree-
ment had a problem about paving but that Layton City 
hadn't been notified of it yet, and that one purpose of the 
proposed interconnection of the two municipal water sys-
tems was to alleviate the expense burden on East Layton 
Town for water which it could not use (T.174:25). He 
knew of no reason why the sewer and water systems 
couldn't be interconnected unless it was the expense fac-
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tor for Layton City residents, for the out-of-town charge. 
He testified of no other problem in developing petition-
er's land in two municipalities, and no one is in a better 
position to know than he is. 
The Layton City Engineer, Byron McGregor, testi-
fied that many municipalities operate under cooperative 
agreements to handle developed property on their com· 
mon boundaries (T.188: 13), and that the cost of putting 
the facilities in the ground on the tract in question is the 
same no matter whose water is in the pipe (T.197: 18). He 
further testified that an out-of-town charge for Layton 
City residents is no probelm, since the City can afford to 
absorb the charge if it doesn't have to invest in a sewer 
line. 
Upon analysis then, it is clear that petitioner never 
intended or tried to develop his ground through Layton 
City, but assumed that he would disconnect it. His claim 
that Layton City was not interested in his ground and that 
it is impossible to develop in two municipalities simply 
won't wash. 
POINT IV. 
LAYTON CITY IS BOTH WILLING AND CAPABLE 
OF PROVIDING NEEDED MUNICIPAL SERVICES 
TO THE EIGHTY-ACRE TRACT. 
Layton City, with a population of 13,621, is the 
second largest city in Davis County. It has a growth rate 
of 5 7 % since the 1960 census. (T .171: 7). The tract in 
question is located about three miles from the business 
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area of Layton City (T.29:16-19) and about one and one-
half miles from the nearest large residential subdivision 
r in Layton (T.29:30). Layton City has two separate water 
systems, one located east of the tract in question, at a 
higher elevation, and one to the north and west of the 
tract. The first system has a million-gallon storage reser-
voir which serves the higher elevations of the city (T.182, e 
e 
e 
l 
r 
r 
[} 
[} 
.t 
y 
E 
s 
.e 
:e 
n 
;s 
183), and an additional million-gallon capacity is being 
built into that system. There is an eight-inch water line 
running east from the intersection of Church Street and 
Syracuse Road (marked in red on Exhibit E) which can 
serve the tract in question, and is only 400 ft. from it. 
(T.184:3-10). The line has plenty of pressure, pumping 
would be unnecessary (T.184: 14). Additionally, the city 
has Hill Field water reservoir which stores a million gal-
lons, two wells which deliver 3,400 gallons per minute, 
and a storage reservoir on East Gentile Street with a mil-
lion and a half gallon storage capacity. It has a fourth 
storage reservoir of three-quarters of a million gallons 
capacity on the Mountain Road, and a fifth storage tank 
of one quarter million gallons on the mountain slope 
east of the tract in question (T.185). 
So, the city has water storage of five and one-half 
million gallons located on three sides of the property, 
and an eight-inch water line within 400 ft. of the prop-
erty. That line, incidnetally, has never been out of ser-
vice (T.183:14), although petitioner recalled that it had 
(T.33:26). East Layton Town, on the other hand, has a 
ten-inch water line whose closest point to the land in 
question is about 900-1,000 ft. (Exhibit E by scale). It is 
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clear, then, that Layton City is closer to the property with 
water and is fulJy able to serve it. It is also willing to 
serve it (Exhibit 4). The reason it has not moved to do so 
is simply that it has never been asked (T.185:13-20; T. 
191:29 to T.192:1-17). 
The same is true of the sewer (T.193:24). Layton 
City has never been requested to cooperate with petition· 
er in bringing the sewer to the tract. The nearest Layton 
City sewer is about 900 ft. from the tract (Exhibit E, scale). 
This line would be necessary for a gravity sewer line to 
serve the northwest portion of the tract in question, since 
it is on the other side of a ridge (T.194:19) and could not 
be served by the petitioner-East Layton Town outfall line 
to the south without the use of a lift station (T.67:29 to 
T.68:23). If disconnection is denied, it is quite likely that 
a cooperative use agreement will be entered into between 
Layton City and East Layton Town for us of the outfall 
line to serve the residences in Layton City (T.188: 13; 
T.200: 13). These municipalities have cooperated on 
other projects to their mutual advantage. But even if such 
did not come to pass, a sewage lift station would serve 
the tract in question on the south slope (T.187:8-23). 
If the tract were built up and improved by petition· 
er, all municipal services and facilities would be available 
from Layton City to the residents of the tract, including 
water, sewer, police protection, fire protection, library, 
ambulance service, garbage pickup, street lighting, street 
maintenance, storm sewer drainage, parks, recreational 
facilities including swimming pool, tennis courts, and 
baseball and football leagues (T.148, 149). Layton City 
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has, in its long-range planning, expended money in prep-
aration for the facilities which would be installed in and 
used to serve the tract in question (T.186: 12-27; T.188: 
2-12). This tract is necessary to the future growth and 
development of Layton City (T.171:23). 
By contrast, East Layton Town into which the tract 
proposed to be severed would go, has 743 people (T.177: 
24). Its business district is a cafe and service station on 
Highway 89 (T.177:25; T.133:27) located about one and 
) one-half to two miles from the tract in question (T.134:3). 
e The town has no fire department; its fire protection comes 
't from Layton City under contract. It has no police de-
e partment; any police protection it gets is through Davis 
o County, headquartered at Farmington. It contracts its 
.t garbage pickup through a private contractor. Davis 
n County does its street repair under contract. It has no 
11 parks, no recreation facilities. It has no library (T.53, 
1; 54; T.124 to T.126). 
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Most interesting is the eagerness of the East Layton 
Town officers to get this ground out of Layton City and 
into their unprepared but lately ambitious town. And 
why not? The total increase would add over 2,000 souls 
(three times what they now have), of which half would 
be on the tract in question in this suit. A fine prize! The 
town's officers denied they were banking on the ground's 
being brought in so as to make their town solvent, but 
their testimony is suspect in light of their statements about 
tax base. First, Mr. Mohler (T.122:20): 
A. Well, of course, it is growth for us and the 
fact that the south portion was developed, the 
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~ewer and water lines were put in with the 
Intent to develop the entire area. Of course 
it i~ th~ tax bas~ ground and the growth 
which 1s the desirable thing to us. 
and again at T.123:8: 
Q. And, East Layton Town wants this develop. 
ment within its city? 
A. Absolutely, yes. We put a lot of effort in with 
Mr. Sawyer since 1965, of course. We cer· 
tainly do want it. 
Then Mr. Follett (T.179:5-13): 
A. I assume he will apply for annexation and I 
won't be a bit surprised if he were annexed. 
I couldn't say for sure because each member 
of the board has his own vote. 
Q. You would want that though, wouldn't you? 
A. Yes, I would. 
Q. It wouldn't be economically feasible for East 
Layton Town to supply water and sewer to 
this other parcel unless it had the revenue 
from that other parcel, isn't that correct? 
A. Yes, that is correct. 
Layton City, though one and one-half years younger 
than East Layton Town, did not grow to eighteen times 
the size of the town by being indifferent to developers and 
subdividers, and ignoring their needs. It has established 
procedures for working with them, and those procedures 
have served well both the developers and the city (T.157: 
24; T.160:5; T.169:23 to T-170:15; T.189:21; T.190:1; 
T.199:17-28; and T.191:9). But it is difficult for a city 
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to help a developer if he ignores the city. In this connec-
tion, there was much smoke from petitioner's counsel in 
the cross-examination of the city's witnesses, calculated to 
create the impression that petitioner had contacted Layton 
City numerous times. Not so. Those questions and 
answers relate to compromise conferences, held after the 
petition was filed, after petitioner had made his plans and 
completely bypassed the city. Petitioner himself admitted 
this, and it was confirmed by his engineer and by all the 
Layton City witnesses. As is more fully developed in Point 
III above, petitioner brought no plans to the city, filed 
nothing with the city, and spent only ten or fifteen min-
utes with its engineer. Layton City didn't ignore him; 
he ignored Layton City. 
Which brings us to an overall perspective of the 
entire situation. 
SUMMARY 
Petitioner owns a 160-acre tract of choice residential 
development land, divided in half by the common bound-
ary line between Layton City and East Layton Town. Lay-
ton City, with a population of 13,621, a building and 
engineering department experienced in working with de-
velopers, a complete water system with adequate pressure, 
a sewer system recently expanded in the direction of 
the tract, and a full range of municipal services and facili-
ties, is capable and willing to serve the tract which lies 
within its boundaries. But East Layton Town wants the 
Layton City part of the tract transferred into East Layton 
Town because it has spent money to take water and sewer 
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to its side of the tract, and the financial commitment on 
the bonds is considerable. The town's officers made the 
decision to install the water and sewer lines to serve the 
petitioner's land one year after its citizens had turned 
down a bond issue in an election, and they made that de-
cision on the recommendation of their newly hired con-
sulting engineer, who by coincidence turned out to be the 
engineer for the developer, too. Getting the eighty acres 
from Layton City, with its 240 plus residential units and 
its thousand or so people would do a lot for the town's 
tax base. 
But if the tract were taken from Layton City and put 
into East Layton Town, where would the residents get fire 
proection? From Layton City. And police protection? 
From Davis County. And street repair? From Davis 
County. And all the other municipal services? From 
somewhere other than East Layton Town. Those people 
will play golf in the Layton City park. Their children 
will swim in the Layton City pool. Their young people 
will play tennis on the Layton City courts. They all will 
find interesting books in the Layton City library. The 
parents will travel to and from stores on roads built and 
maintained by Layton City. The young people will at· 
tend schools with those from the other Layton City sub· 
divisions, such as Aspen East with its 150 homes. Most 
by far of the commercial, recreational, educational and 
social ties of these people will be with Layton City, its 
people, its stores and institutions. Those people who will 
live on the land in question belong in Layton City. 
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CONCLUSION 
The findings and decree of the trial court are not 
supported by the evidence. The evidence, and fair infer-
ences therefrom, preponderate the other way. Addition-
ally, the court applied an erroneous concept of the law 
to the facts which may be fairly found. The tract should 
remain in and be served by Layton City. The decree of 
the district court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
K. ROGER BEAN 
Bean, Bean & Smedley 
190 S. Fort Lane, Suite 2 
Layton, Utah 84041 
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